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 Like millions of Americans, my wife Trish and I remained glued to 
our televisions throughout the 2000 presidential election crisis in 
Florida. Because Trish is not an attorney, she frequently asked for 
my legal opinion on the various judicial proceedings. For instance, 
she believed that the United States Supreme Court was so “peeved at 
the shenanigans” that it would intervene.1 I assured her, based upon 
my extensive study of justiciability,2 that the Justices would decline 
jurisdiction.3 I also confidently predicted that, in the unlikely event 
                                                                                                                    
 * Earl F. Nelson Professor, University of Missouri School of Law; Visiting Professor, 
Pepperdine University School of Law. J.D., Yale University, 1988. Thanks to Tracey 
George, Grant Nelson, and the symposium participants for their comments on this paper. 
 1. Trish grew up in East Africa and Ireland, and she often uses phrases that sound 
like they belong in an English drawing-room comedy. 
 2. See, e.g., Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Why the Supreme Court Never Gets Any “Dear 
John” Letters: Advisory Opinions in Historical Perspective, 87 GEO. L.J. 473 (1998) [here-
inafter Pushaw, Advisory]; Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Congressional Power Over Federal Court 
Jurisdiction: A Defense of the Neo-Federalist Interpretation of Article III, 1997 BYU L. REV. 
847, 864-73 [hereinafter Pushaw, Congressional Power]; Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciabil-
ity and Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist Approach, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 393 (1996) 
[hereinafter Pushaw, Justiciability]; Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Article III’s Case/Controversy 
Distinction and the Dual Functions of Federal Courts, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447 (1994) 
[hereinafter Pushaw, Case/Controversy]. 
 3. First, Bush did not seem to have third-party standing to allege that Florida’s 
nonuniform standards for counting votes violated the Equal Protection rights of state vot-
ers. Second, the case did not appear to be ripe because the Constitution and federal stat-
utes provided that presidential election disputes must be resolved, at least initially, in the 
states and then Congress. Third, success in those political institutions would have mooted 
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the Court reached the merits, it could not possibly hold that the 
Equal Protection Clause required states to administer their elections 
without discrepancies, because such inconsistencies are one price we 
pay for our federal system.4 
 As usual, I was wrong, and my wife was right. I was focusing on 
legal abstractions, whereas she was attuned to political realities. A 
rather obvious point dawned on me: How could judicial decisions on 
elections, the very focus of politics, not be politicized? And yet there 
are established, seemingly neutral principles of constitutional “law” 
that govern judicial review of elections. Peter Shane and Harold 
Krent are surprised (as I initially was) by the Court’s failure to apply 
that law in Bush v. Gore.5  
 Upon further reflection, however, I concluded that the Rehnquist 
Court was following the law—specifically, the landmark precedent in 
this area, Baker v. Carr.6 As in Baker, the majority in Bush (1) de-
termined that the political process would not remedy a perceived 
electoral crisis in a Southern state; (2) ignored principles of justicia-
bility and federalism that generally prevented Article III courts from 
interfering with state electoral matters; and (3) made up new “stan-
dards” under the Equal Protection Clause and held that the state 
had violated them.7 In each case, dissenting Justices asserted that 
the majority’s entanglement in the political thicket would erode re-
spect for the Court as the impartial guardian of the rule of law.8 
Understanding this connection between Bush v. Gore and Baker v. 
Carr helps to explain my reaction to the two main arguments 
presented by my fellow panelists. 
                                                                                                                    
Bush’s claim. Fourth, the flexible political question doctrine enabled the Court to interpret 
the Constitution as granting Congress final authority to decide the matter. 
 In short, the Court could have declined to review the case on several justiciability 
grounds. Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Bush v. Gore: Looking at Baker v. Carr in a Conservative 
Mirror, 18 CONST. COMM. (forthcoming 2001) [hereinafter Pushaw, Conservative Mirror] 
(describing the potential application of the justiciability doctrines in Bush). 
 4. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 123 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
the Equal Protection Clause did not authorize the Court to question the states’ power ei-
ther to fix standards for determining whether a vote has been legally cast or to allow coun-
ties to design their own balloting systems). 
 5. See Peter M. Shane, Disappearing Democracy: How Bush v. Gore Undermined the 
Federal Right to Vote for Presidential Electors, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 535, 535, 579, 584 
(2001) (characterizing the majority’s opinion as “extraordinary,” “stunning,” and “astonish-
ing”); Harold J. Krent, Judging Judging: The Problem of Second-Guessing State Judges’ 
Interpretation of State Law in Bush v. Gore, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 493, 493, 497 (2001) 
(deeming the Court’s decision “surprising,” “astonishing,” and “startling”). 
  6. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). I have compared these two cases in exhaustive detail in 
Pushaw, Conservative Mirror, supra note 3.  
  7. See infra notes 20-50 and accompanying text (fleshing out this analogy between 
Baker and Bush).  
 8. See infra notes 31, 49 and accompanying text (summarizing and comparing these 
dissenting opinions). 
2001]                         REPLY TO KRENT AND SHANE 605 
 
 First, I agree with Professor Krent that the political question doc-
trine did not preclude the Court from deciding the presidential elec-
tion dispute.9 Baker turned this doctrine into a prudential case-by-
case judgment call, and ever since the Court has almost always exer-
cised this unbridled discretion in favor of intervening in heavily poli-
ticized disputes—including several that involved state decisions af-
fecting federal elections.10 Professor Shane is undoubtedly right that 
the Court could have avoided decision on political question grounds,11 
but that is always true, because Baker leaves this determination en-
tirely to the Justices’ discretion. Although I am sympathetic to 
Shane’s position that the Court should have declined to decide the 
case, that is really an argument for a pre-Baker regime of judicial re-
straint, not against the Court’s application of the current political 
question doctrine in Bush. 
  Second, Professor Shane is correct that, contrary to the opinion of 
seven Justices in Bush, the Equal Protection Clause does not grant 
candidates a right to uniform standards in counting votes.12 But nei-
ther does that Clause require legislative representation to be based 
solely on population, as Baker held and Shane assumes.13 In any 
event, Baker provides a “precedent” for the Court to ignore that 
Clause’s text, drafting and ratification history, implementation by 
Congress and the states, and cases interpreting it. Therefore, al-
though I believe that both Baker and Bush were wrongly decided, the 
latter is more defensible simply because it departed less radically 
from the Court’s existing practice. 
 I will begin by outlining my comparison of these two cases. 
Against this backdrop, I will evaluate the main themes of Professors 
Krent and Shane. 
I.   BUSH V. GORE: BAKER V. CARR WITH A CONSERVATIVE TWIST 
 The Court employed the same decisionmaking process in Bush as 
it did in Baker, albeit to reach a conservative rather than liberal re-
sult.  
                                                                                                                    
 9. See Krent, supra note 5, at 511. 
 10. See infra notes 23-26, 32-44, 52-59 and accompanying text (discussing the rele-
vant passages from Baker and subsequent cases). 
 11. See Shane, supra note 5, at 580-82. 
 12. See id. at 552. 
 13. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 226 (1962); see also Shane, supra note 5, at 548 (cit-
ing the apportionment cases approvingly as part of the “democratic trajectory” of constitu-
tional law since 1868). 
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A.   The Prelude to Baker 
 Baker reversed, sub silentio, an unbroken line of precedent dating 
back to 1849.14 In Luther v. Borden,15 the Court accepted the judg-
ment of Congress and the President that Rhode Island satisfied Arti-
cle IV, Section 4, which provides that “the United States shall guar-
antee to every State in this Union a republican form of Govern-
ment.”16 Although Luther did not hold that all claims under the 
Guarantee Clause raised political questions,17 the Court created such 
an absolute prohibition in 1912.18 Most pertinently, beginning in 
1916, it rejected nearly all constitutional attacks on state legislative 
apportionment schemes based upon either nonjusticiability or equi-
table discretion to decline jurisdiction because of federalism con-
cerns.19  
                                                                                                                    
 14. For an extensive analysis of these decisions, see Pushaw, Conservative Mirror, su-
pra note 3. 
 15. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849). 
 16. Id. at 42-45. 
 17. For instance, the Court acknowledged that a state could declare martial law tem-
porarily to meet threats to its very existence (as Rhode Island had done), and thus declined 
“to inquire to what extent, nor under what circumstances, that power may be exercised by 
a State” before a Guarantee Clause violation would occur. Id. at 45. By negative implica-
tion, the Court could hear complaints that a state did allegedly violate that Clause, such as 
by declaring permanent martial law.  
 Indeed, numerous cases after Luther did exactly that. See New York v. United States, 
505 U.S. 144, 184-85 (1992) (citing these decisions and acknowledging that the Court had, 
over the previous eighty years, misconstrued Luther as barring all claims under the Re-
publican Form of Government Clause). At the time Baker was decided, however, all of the 
Justices assumed that such allegations raised political questions. 
 18. Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 142-51 (1912) (holding 
nonjusticiable a complaint that a state government had become unrepublican by enacting a 
law through the initiative rather than the legislative process). Subsequent cases that 
deemed Guarantee Clause cases to involve political questions include Highland Farms 
Dairy v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608, 612 (1937); Ohio ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Metropolitan Park 
District, 281 U.S. 74, 79 (1930); and Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219, 
234-35 (1917). 
 19. The seminal case is Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565 (1916) (refusing 
to decide the political question of whether the invalidation of a state reapportionment 
statute by referendum violated the Republican Form of Government Clause). In Colegrove 
v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946), the Court dismissed a claim that a state law had violated the 
Constitution by creating congressional districts that did not account for population shifts 
to metropolitan areas. Justice Frankfurter and two colleagues found a political question. 
Id. at 552-56. Justice Rutledge assumed justiciability, but invoked equitable discretion to 
refrain from intervening because of the sensitive political issues involved in drawing con-
gressional districts. Id. at 564-66 (Rutledge, J., concurring). Three dissenters maintained 
that the statute violated the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 566-74 (Black, J., dissenting). 
Two Justices did not participate. The Court swiftly applied Colegrove in a pair of brief per 
curiam opinions and declined to entertain constitutional challenges to state electoral laws. 
See Colegrove v. Barrett, 330 U.S. 804 (1947); Turman v. Duckworth, 329 U.S. 829 (1946). 
 In MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281 (1948), however, a five-man majority held, on the 
merits, that the Equal Protection Clause did not deprive states of their authority to give 
rural areas disproportionate influence in the nomination process. Id. at 283-84. Nonethe-
less, two years later the Court reverted back to the Colegrove approach by dismissing, on 
“political question” and “equitable discretion” grounds, a Fourteenth Amendment claim 
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B.   The Baker Breakthrough 
 Baker v. Carr20 addressed a critical electoral problem that could 
not readily be solved by the ordinary political process.21 Like most 
states, Tennessee apportioned legislative districts to account for a 
host of demographic, geographical, political, economic, and historical 
interests, often with the special goal of preserving the electoral power 
of conservative agricultural communities against the burgeoning 
(and more liberal) metropolitan areas.22 The Court refashioned the 
political question doctrine as based exclusively upon separation of 
powers (not federalism)23 and as necessitating a “case-by-case in-
quiry”24 weighing several factors, most importantly whether there 
was “a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the is-
sue to a coordinate political department.”25 The Court concluded that 
the plaintiffs’ claim, although nonjusticiable under the Guarantee 
Clause, could be reviewed under the Equal Protection Clause.26 In-
stead of setting forth specific legal principles to govern cases involv-
ing apportionment controversies, however, the Court merely de-
clared:  
                                                                                                                    
that Georgia’s voting scheme discriminated against urban dwellers. See South v. Peters, 
339 U.S. 276, 277 (1950). Thereafter, the Court applied a similar analysis in refusing to 
hear all constitutional challenges to state apportionment laws in a series of terse per cu-
riam orders that usually rested on a bare citation to Colegrove. See, e.g., Matthews v. 
Handley, 361 U.S. 127 (1959); Radford v. Gary, 352 U.S. 991 (1957); Kidd v. McCanless, 
352 U.S. 920 (1956); Anderson v. Jordan, 343 U.S. 912 (1952); Remmey v. Smith, 342 U.S. 
916 (1952); Tedesco v. Bd. of Supervisors, 339 U.S. 940 (1950). 
 Thus, although in Colegrove only three of seven Justices found the constitutional com-
plaint to be a political question, the case came to stand for the proposition that federal 
judges should not decide such claims. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 252 (1962) (Clark, 
J., concurring) (arguing that the Court had read Colegrove as based upon nonjusticiability 
and a rejection of any possible Fourteenth Amendment issue). Indeed, the only time the 
Court exercised jurisdiction was to protect blacks from discriminatory state electoral laws, 
which violated the Fifteenth (not the Fourteenth) Amendment. See, e.g., Gomillion v. 
Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). 
 20. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 21. For a more thorough explanation of the various opinions in Baker and its progeny, 
see Pushaw, Conservative Mirror, supra note 3.  
 22. Baker, 369 U.S. at 187-95 (stressing that Tennessee had failed to amend its 1901 
apportionment law, despite the huge subsequent population shift to urban areas); id. at 
268-69, 301-24 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (emphasizing the multiplicity of interests in-
volved in apportioning legislatures); see also Gus Tyler, Court Versus Legislature, 27 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 390, 395-98 (1962) (arguing that rural overrepresentation maintained 
the political power of conservatives against more liberal urban and suburban citizens, 
whose numbers had exploded). 
 23. Baker, 369 U.S. at 210, 226. The majority attempted to distinguish numerous 
cases holding that, to preserve federalism, the Court would not interfere with state appor-
tionment schemes. Id. at 231-37. 
 24. Id. at 210. 
 25. Id. at 211, 217. 
 26. Id. at 208-37. 
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Judicial standards under the Equal Protection Clause are well de-
veloped and familiar, and it has been open to courts since the en-
actment of the Fourteenth Amendment to determine, if on the par-
ticular facts they must, that a discrimination reflects no policy, but 
simply arbitrary and capricious action.27 
 In separate dissents, Justices Frankfurter and Harlan made three 
related points.28 First, the majority had repudiated uniform prece-
dent treating apportionment as a political question under the Repub-
lican Form of Government Clause, which had reflected the Court’s 
former respect for state government autonomy in balancing the myr-
iad policy considerations involved.29 Second, neither the Equal Pro-
tection Clause nor any other constitutional provision indicated that 
representation must be based on population alone.30 Third, the 
majority’s radical intrusion into internal state affairs would compro-
mise public confidence in the Court’s independence and authority, 
which rested largely upon its detachment from wholly political dis-
putes.31 
C.   Baker Consolidated 
 The Court quickly translated Baker’s jurisdictional holding into 
substantive law. Most importantly, Reynolds v. Sims32 established 
that the Equal Protection Clause requires state legislatures to be ap-
portioned according to equality of population “as nearly as is practi-
cable.”33 In the earlier case of Gray v. Sanders,34 the Court had ap-
plied this “one person, one vote” rule to invalidate a state districting 
framework for elections to statewide executive offices and the federal 
Senate.35 In Wesberry v. Sanders,36 the Justices found the same prin-
                                                                                                                    
 27. Id. at 226.  
 28. Id. at 266-330 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); id. at 330-49 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 29. Id. at 266-69, 277-324 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); id. at 332-34, 338-39 (Harlan, 
J., dissenting). 
 30. Id. at 300-23 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); id. at 332-36, 338-39 (Harlan, J., 
dissenting). 
 31. Id. at 267-69, 324 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); id. at 339-40 (Harlan, J., dissent-
ing). They also deplored the Court’s refusal to mention any Equal Protection principles and 
its suggestion that the mere prospect of reapportionment by federal judges under amor-
phous Equal Protection standards might spur state legislatures to take action without the 
need for further judicial supervision. See id. at 267-69, 327-28 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); 
id. at 339 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 Baker, then, is an odd form of advisory opinion. See Pushaw, Advisory, supra note 2, at 
477-91 (discussing the historical arguments for and against such opinions). The Court ad-
vised state legislatures that they were unconstitutional, failed to tell them exactly why, 
and threatened them with dire consequences if they did not reapportion. 
 32. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
 33. Id. at 559. The Court formulated that standard in the course of a lengthy analysis. 
See id. at 554-87. 
 34. 372 U.S. 368 (1963). 
 35. Id. at 370-80. 
 36. 376 U.S. 1 (1964). 
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ciple lurking in Article I, Section 2, Clause 1, which addresses dis-
tricting for the House of Representatives.37 Finally, the Court ex-
tended the principle of these apportionment decisions—that all vot-
ers must have an equal opportunity to participate in elections—to 
voter qualifications (for example, by striking down wealth-based 
classifications such as poll taxes).38 
 In all of these cases, Justice Harlan dissented because these hold-
ings (1) lacked any foundation in the Constitution’s text, history, or 
precedent, which recognized the states’ independence in apportioning 
legislative districts and setting voter qualifications, and (2) aban-
doned the Court’s appropriately limited role in our federal system.39 
 Whatever its constitutional provenance, the “one person, one vote” 
maxim resonated with Americans, who had become predominantly 
urban and suburban and thus disliked state laws that magnified ru-
ral electoral power.40 Despite some criticism of Baker immediately af-
ter its release,41 scholars swiftly embraced it.42 Moreover, the Court 
has never wavered from its position that electoral disputes are justi-
ciable and that the “one person, one vote” standard should be applied 
to resolve them.43 Today both Justices and law professors tend to un-
                                                                                                                    
 37. Id. at 7-18. 
 38. See, e.g., Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665-70 (1966). 
 39. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 615-24 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Gray, 372 
U.S. at 382-90 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 20-50 (Harlan, J., dissenting); 
Harper, 383 U.S. at 680-86 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 40. See, e.g., Jo Desha Lucas, Legislative Apportionment and Representative Govern-
ment: The Meaning of Baker v. Carr, 61 MICH. L. REV. 711, 804 (1963) (conceding Baker’s 
popularity but decrying its lawlessness). Although the Court in Baker and its progeny es-
poused democratic ideals, in one sense these cases are the antithesis of democracy: Seven 
men sitting at the apex of the most unrepresentative branch of government imposed their 
personal theory of democracy upon every state in the union.  
 41. See, e.g., Alexander M. Bickel, The Durability of Colegrove v. Green, 72 YALE L.J. 
39, 43-45 (1962) (urging the Court to abstain because of the impossibility of developing 
principled legal standards to determine the validity of apportionment laws); Robert G. 
McCloskey, The Supreme Court, 1961 Term—Foreword: The Reapportionment Case, 76 
HARV. L. REV. 54 (1962).  
 42. See, e.g., Charles L. Black, Inequities in Districting for Congress: Baker v. Carr 
and Colegrove v. Green, 72 YALE L.J. 13 (1962) (applauding the Court for remedying injus-
tices in apportionment by recognizing a new fundamental right to equal treatment in vot-
ing). Within a few years the legal academy generally had come around to the view of Pro-
fessor Black and many others. See Pushaw, Conservative Mirror, supra note 3 (summa-
rizing the scholarly reaction to the reapportionment cases).  
 Moreover, Professor Ely bolstered the intellectual credibility of Baker and its progeny by 
arguing that judicial review should be exercised only in situations where representative 
government cannot be trusted because of breakdowns in the political process, as occurred 
when entrenched state legislators refused to reapportion. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY 
AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 73-183 (1980). 
 43. Indeed, the Court has reiterated these principles so often that they no longer gen-
erate much dissent. See, e.g., Dep’t of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442, 456-59 (1992) 
(unanimously allowing a challenge to Congress’s choice of a method for apportioning con-
gressional districts among states under Article I, Section 2, but concluding that the statute 
passed constitutional muster). 
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questioningly accept Baker as a landmark Warren Court decision 
that established principles of constitutional “law,” not a mere liberal 
political coup.44 
D.   Bush v. Gore 
 Instead of rehashing Bush in Gore-y detail, I will highlight five 
critical aspects of its similarity to Baker. First, a majority of the Jus-
tices saw a national electoral emergency—the 2000 presidential elec-
tion impasse in Florida—that seemed to defy a clean political solu-
tion.45 Second, the Court flicked away justiciability concerns, even 
though the Constitution appears to entrust the resolution of presi-
dential election disputes to the states and Congress, at least in the 
first instance.46 Third, the majority concluded that principles of fed-
eralism did not require strong deference to state officials (including 
judges) in interpreting and implementing their election laws.47 
Fourth, all but two Justices discovered an unprecedented Equal Pro-
tection Clause “right” to uniform standards in counting ballots.48 
Fifth, the dissenting Justices accused the majority of abandoning ju-
dicial restraint by failing to dismiss on political question grounds and 
by ignoring precedent concerning judicial federalism and Equal Pro-
tection.49 
 Despite all these similarities to Baker, law professors (including 
Shane and Krent) have overwhelmingly expressed surprise and out-
                                                                                                                    
 44. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION 127, 141 (1987); 
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 93, 98, 260 (1993); see also J.M. Balkin & 
Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 964, 997-1002 
(1998) (noting that liberal scholars have canonized Baker and other “beloved” Warren 
Court precedents and have not tolerated any suggestion that these cases might be incor-
rect). A few scholars have challenged this orthodoxy. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Political 
Judgments, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 637, 639-40 (2001) (arguing that the Baker Court failed to 
explain coherently its Equal Protection holding, its abandonment of the political question 
doctrine, and its notion that federal judges could avoid getting sullied in adjudicating elec-
toral disputes). 
 45. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 100-03 (2000) (detailing the relevant facts and pro-
cedural history). The Court, of course, said that it was intervening to uphold the law, not to 
break a political deadlock. See id. at 111. 
 46. See id. at 111. 
 47. See id. at 103-11; see also id. at 111-22 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (charging the 
Florida Supreme Court with amending, not merely construing, its legislature’s directives 
regarding the appointment of electors). 
 48. See id. at 102-08 (per curiam opinion joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and O’Connor, 
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ.). Justices Souter and Breyer agreed with the Equal Pro-
tection holding, but they would have dismissed the case as nonjusticiable. Id. at 133-34 
(Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 143-46 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 49. See id. at 123-29 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 135-44 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
Of course, I recognize certain distinctions between Baker and Bush, but I find them to be 
largely irrelevant for reasons outlined in Pushaw, Conservative Mirror, supra note 3. 
2001]                         REPLY TO KRENT AND SHANE 611 
 
rage at Bush.50 This reaction reminds me of the scene in Casablanca 
where Louis proclaims that he is “shocked” to discover that people 
are gambling in Rick’s Cafe and then pockets a payoff. The most 
plausible explanation for this response is that Bush reached a politi-
cally conservative result that most of the legal academy finds dis-
tasteful, whereas Baker produced a politically liberal result that they 
favor. But the process of decisionmaking in both cases was nearly 
identical. With this background in mind, I will analyze the two major 
issues explored by my co-panelists. 
II.   THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION DISPUTE: “POLITICAL” OR “LEGAL”? 
 Although Bush potentially implicated every category of justiciabil-
ity,51 I will follow the lead of Professors Shane and Krent by focusing 
on one—the political question doctrine.  
A.   The “Law” Governing Political Questions 
 In Baker v. Carr,52 the Court declared: 
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political 
question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commit-
ment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of 
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; 
or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determina-
tion of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility 
of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing 
lack of respect due coordinate branches of government; or an un-
usual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision al-
ready made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifari-
ous pronouncements by various departments on one question.53 
Unfortunately, these six criteria provide little concrete guidance in 
distinguishing “political” from “justiciable” questions. Most signifi-
cantly, Articles I and II contain “a textually demonstrable commit-
ment” of all legislative and executive powers to Congress and the 
President, but that surely does not immunize their exercise from ju-
dicial review. Rather, the pivotal consideration must be whether the 
Constitution leaves an issue to a political branch for final decision. 
That determination, however, cannot be made by consulting the 
Constitution’s text, which nowhere explicitly mentions judicial re-
                                                                                                                    
 50. To take the most publicized example, well over 500 legal academics signed an 
advertisement in The New York Times on January 13, 2001, asserting that the Court “used 
its power to act as political partisans, not judges of a court of law. . . . By taking power 
from the voters, the Supreme Court has tarnished its own legitimacy.” 
 51. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 52. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). The following discussion of Baker incorporates the conclu-
sions I presented in Pushaw, Justiciability, supra note 2, at 498-501. 
 53. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. 
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view—much less exceptions to this power. The other five Baker fac-
tors are also infinitely elastic.54 
 In its “case-by-case inquiry”55 weighing these six criteria in six-
teen situations, the Court routinely has found even the most politi-
cally laden matters to be justiciable56—including every constitutional 
challenge to electoral decisions.57 Only two questions have been 
deemed “political”: military training and procedures (Gilligan v. 
Morgan)58 and impeachment (Walter Nixon v. United States).59 With 
rare exceptions, then, application of the Baker test results in judicial 
intervention. Moreover, these decisions are merely the tip of the ice-
berg, because often the Court summarily asserts jurisdiction over a 
case that arguably raises political questions without even mentioning 
Baker.  
B.   Did Bush v. Gore Present Nonjusticiable Issues? 
1.   The Justices’ Cryptic Opinions 
 Interestingly, no Justice in Bush cited Baker or used the term 
“political question doctrine.” Nonetheless, the various opinions re-
veal an understanding of its potential applicability, especially in 
                                                                                                                    
 54. For instance, many constitutional provisions appear to “lack . . . judicially discov-
erable and manageable standards” and to require “an initial policy determination of a kind 
clearly for nonjudicial discretion,” id. at 217, but that has not stopped the Court from in-
terpreting and applying them. Indeed, Baker and its progeny provide a perfect example: 
The Court discovered in the Equal Protection Clause sufficiently manageable “judicial” 
standards to measure the validity of apportionment laws that reflected exceptionally com-
plicated “policy determinations.” See supra notes 26-38 and accompanying text (describing 
these cases). Likewise, any exercise of judicial review potentially will reverse “a political 
decision already made,” cause the political departments “embarrassment,” and display a 
“lack of respect.” Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.  
 55. Id. at 210. 
 56. Perhaps the most famous example is Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969), 
in which the Court reviewed (and invalidated) the House of Representatives’ exercise of its 
Article I, Section 5, Clause 1 power to “be the Judge of the qualifications of its own Mem-
bers.” Id. at 512-50. See Pushaw, Justiciability, supra note 2, at 498-99 (describing Powell 
and other decisions). 
 57. Most pertinent are cases involving state government actions that affected federal 
elections. See Dep’t of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442, 456-59 (1992); Wesberry v. 
Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 5-7 (1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 370-76 (1963), discussed 
supra notes 34-37, 43 and accompanying text; see also Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 
118-27 (1986) (upholding the justiciability of a claim of illegal state gerrymandering); Rey-
nolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 582 (1964) (reaffirming Baker’s ruling that state apportion-
ments were not political questions), discussed supra notes 32-33, 39 and accompanying 
text (analyzing Reynolds). 
 58. 413 U.S. 1, 3-10 (1973) (dismissing a complaint that the government’s negligent 
training of the National Guard had caused the deaths of antiwar protestors at Kent State 
University). 
 59. 506 U.S. 224 (1993) (declining to reach the merits of a federal judge’s allegation 
that Article I, Section 3, Clause 6, which grants the Senate “sole Power to try all Im-
peachments,” requires a trial before the full Senate—not merely a hearing before a com-
mittee). 
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discussing two key constitutional provisions. First, Article II, Sec-
tion 1, Clause 2 provides that “[e]ach State shall appoint [presi-
dential electors] in such [m]anner as the Legislature thereof may 
direct.”60 Second, the Twelfth Amendment entrusts the counting of 
electoral votes to Congress, which has made laws necessary and 
proper to implement that power—specifically including statutes 
setting forth procedures for presidential election contests.61 
 Justice Breyer concluded that these provisions granted the states 
and Congress exclusive authority to resolve such disputes, with 
Congress’s judgment final and judicially unreviewable.62 Justice 
Souter apparently agreed.63 The majority, however, dispatched such 
concerns in two sentences: 
 None are more conscious of the vital limits on judicial authority 
than are the members of this Court, and none stand more in admi-
ration of the Constitution’s design to leave the selection of the 
President to the people, through their legislatures, and to the po-
litical sphere. When contending parties invoke the process of the 
courts, however, it becomes our unsought responsibility to resolve 
the federal and constitutional issues the judicial system has been 
forced to confront.64 
2.   Justiciability With Deferential Review 
 It is impossible to say definitively which side is legally correct, be-
cause Baker made political question “law” almost entirely dependent 
on judicial discretion.65 For that reason, the Bush dissenters and Pro-
                                                                                                                    
 60. See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) (interpreting this provision as 
granting state legislatures plenary power in choosing electors); id. at 111-22 (Rehnquist, 
C.J., concurring) (arguing that the Florida Supreme Court violated Article II by altering its 
legislature’s directions concerning the appointment of presidential electors).  
 Conversely, the dissenters contended that the Florida court had merely interpreted (not 
changed) its state’s statutes and that, in any event, Article II did not contemplate review of 
such decisions by the United States Supreme Court. Id. at 123-29 (Stevens, J., dissenting); 
id. at 129-35 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 135-44 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); id. at 144-58 
(Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 61. See id. at 153-58 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also James C. Kirby, Jr., Limitations 
on the Power of State Legislatures Over Presidential Electors, 27 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
495, 498-500 (1962) (citing all relevant constitutional and statutory provisions). 
 62. See Bush, 531 U.S. at 153-58 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 63. See id. at 129 (Souter, J., dissenting) (beginning his opinion by asserting that 
“[t]he Court should not have reviewed” the case and suggesting that any political problems 
might have been resolved by Congress). An essay written long before Bush, and thus not 
politically biased, argued that the Court would likely apply Baker to rule that the Twelfth 
Amendment grants to Congress final power to resolve disputes concerning presidential 
electoral voting. Albert J. Rosenthal, The Constitution, Congress, and Presidential Elec-
tions, 67 MICH. L. REV. 1, 26-30 (1968). 
 64. Bush, 531 U.S. at 111. 
 65. See supra Parts I.B and I.C. For example, the Twelfth Amendment contains “a 
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue [presidential electoral vot-
ing] to a coordinate political department [Congress].” Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 
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fessor Shane can legitimately criticize the Court only for unwisely 
exercising this discretion and not (as they charge) for failing to obey 
the law.66 And, to the extent that the content of this law consists of 
post-Baker decisions, they uniformly support the Bush majority.67 
 Professor Krent provides two further, and persuasive, justifica-
tions for federal judicial intervention in the particular situation pre-
sented in Bush. First, he cites abundant precedent demonstrating 
that the Justices, to protect federal rights, have often reviewed state 
tribunals’ interpretation of state law—including their alleged altera-
tion of that law to defeat federal constitutional rights.68 Second, 
Krent defends the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction to examine the 
Florida judiciary’s construction of its state’s statutes governing the 
appointment of presidential electors.69 He shows that the Framers of 
Article II deliberately vested this appointment power not in Congress 
but in state legislatures, on the basis that the latter were less likely 
to form a coalition to extract promises from presidential candidates, 
were more receptive to state concerns, and were more directly ac-
countable.70 Accordingly, Krent argues that Congress, state execu-
tives, or state judges could circumvent a state legislature’s instruc-
tions regarding the selection of electors unless the Supreme Court 
could oversee their actions.71 Krent further contends, however, that 
                                                                                                                    
(1962). As with all constitutional provisions, however, the Twelfth Amendment is silent as 
to whether courts may review the exercise of this power.  
 Moreover, the Baker Court made the unprecedented assertion that the political question 
doctrine concerned only separation of powers, not federalism (apparently for the purpose of 
justifying its intrusion into a core state political power, the composition of its legislature). 
Id. at 210, 226. If so, then Article II’s grant to state legislatures of power to appoint elec-
tors is simply irrelevant in determining justiciability. 
 66. See Bush, 531 U.S. at 144 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The Court was wrong to take 
this case.”); id. at 156 (“[F]ederal law [n]either foresees [n]or requires resolution of such a 
political issue by this Court.”); id. at 157 (characterizing the Court’s intervention as “le-
gally wrong”). 
 Professor Shane claims that the Justices in the majority abandoned their heretofore 
resolute commitment to the political question doctrine, as exemplified by Nixon. See 
Shane, supra note 5, at 580-83. But Nixon is the lone exception to the Rehnquist Court’s 
otherwise perfect record of finding electoral disputes (and many other political matters) to 
be justiciable. See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text. 
 Therefore, a more accurate way of expressing this criticism would be to say that conser-
vative champions of judicial restraint should have exercised their virtually boundless dis-
cretion afforded by the political question doctrine to decline jurisdiction over the election 
controversy. 
 67. See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text. 
 68. Krent, supra note 5, at 495 (citing cases). 
 69. Id. at 507-11. 
 70. Id. at 509. Professor Shane endorses Justice Breyer’s suggestion that Article II 
disputes should be left to Congress’s sole and unreviewable discretion under the Twelfth 
Amendment. See Shane, supra note 5, at 581-82. This scheme, however, would frustrate 
the Framers’ deliberate decision to vest the power to appoint electors in state legislatures, 
not Congress. See Krent, supra note 5, at 509. 
 71. Krent, supra note 5, at 511. 
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this precedent obliged the Bush majority to accept the Florida high 
court’s interpretation.72  
 I agree with Professor Krent that the presidential election dispute 
presented a justiciable issue but that the Court should have been 
more deferential. I reach this conclusion, however, through some-
what different reasoning. 
 My general approach builds upon Hamilton’s insight that judicial 
review reflects the “natural presumption” that political officials can-
not be “the constitutional judges of their own powers,” but that this 
presumption can be rebutted by “particular provisions in the 
[C]onstitution”73 examined in light of their drafting and ratification 
history, purpose, and place in the Constitution’s political design.74 An 
example of provisions that overcome the strong presumption favoring 
judicial review are those establishing “checks” that confer on one 
branch a limited share of another’s power.75 For instance, Article I 
grants Congress exclusive and unreviewable authority over im-
peachments by giving the House of Representatives the “executive” 
power of prosecuting them and the Senate the “judicial” power of 
judging them.76  
 Thus, the Court in Nixon correctly held impeachment to be a po-
litical question, as Professor Shane argues.77 But I disagree with 
Shane that Nixon dictated a similar ruling in Bush,78 because neither 
                                                                                                                    
 72. Id. at 512. 
 73. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 524-25 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 
1961). The Marshall Court adumbrated a similar approach. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 166-67, 176-79 (1803) (holding that the judiciary alone can inde-
pendently determine whether the political departments have obeyed the constitutional re-
strictions on their power, but recognizing exceptions to judicial review such as the 
President’s conduct of foreign affairs and his nomination of executive and judicial officials). 
As Marbury illustrates, the presumption can be overcome only by certain constitutional 
clauses dealing with the government’s structure and operation, where their interpretation 
by the political branches does not violate individual rights. I have detailed the foregoing 
analysis in Pushaw, Justiciability, supra note 2, at 497-511. 
 74. See Pushaw, Justiciability, supra note 2, at 501, 504-11. 
 75. See id. at 428-30, 505-07. 
 76. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5, and § 3, cls. 6-7. Overwhelming historical evi-
dence demonstrates that the Framers intended for Congress to have sole authority in this 
area. See Pushaw, Justiciability, supra note 2, at 429-30, 505-07 (citing historical sources). 
Moreover, a key purpose of impeachment—to enable Congress to remove federal judges—
would be compromised if those judges had the final word on the constitutional processes 
designed to control them. Id. at 505-06 n.556. Finally, the Constitution’s underlying politi-
cal theory of checks and balances requires that impeachment be committed exclusively to 
legislative discretion. Id. at 429-30, 505-07.  
 A similar analysis applies to the Constitution’s other classic check, the executive veto, 
which enables the President to share in (and thus curb) the “legislative power.” See id. at 
428-29, 505-06 (arguing that the President’s exercise of his veto power cannot be chal-
lenged in court). 
 77. See Walter Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993); see also Shane, supra note 
5, at 581. 
 78. Shane, supra note 5, at 581-83. 
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Article II nor the Twelfth Amendment contains a pure check. Rather, 
these two structural constitutional provisions (like many others) are 
justiciable yet should be interpreted by according the highest respect 
to the judgments of the government officials primarily entrusted with 
administering them.79 
3.   Application of the Proper Standard of Review in Bush v. Gore 
 Article II bestows on state legislatures vast power to direct the 
appointment of presidential electors.80 The Court appropriately re-
viewed the Florida Supreme Court’s order because doing so was nec-
essary to ensure that the latter tribunal did not alter its legislature’s 
statutory requirements for selecting presidential electors.81 Because 
                                                                                                                    
 79. An example of such a provision is Article IV’s Republican Form of Government 
Clause. In Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), the Court erroneously assumed that all 
complaints under this Clause were political questions. Id. at 209-10, 217-29. Rather, fed-
eral courts presumptively can review such claims, but should yield to Congress and the 
President when they have determined that a state government is republican, absent an ex-
traordinary situation such as a declaration of permanent martial law. See Luther v. Bor-
den, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42-45 (1849); see also supra note 17 (noting that the Court adjudi-
cated many Guarantee Clause cases between 1849 and 1912).  
 Applying this analysis to the facts of Baker, the Court should have accepted the judg-
ment of the federal political branches that Tennessee’s apportionment scheme was suffi-
ciently republican, because neither the Guarantee Clause nor any other constitutional pro-
vision suggests that representation based on factors other than population (e.g., geography 
and economic interests) is “unrepublican.” Indeed, the Senate and the Electoral College re-
fute that argument. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text. 
 The Baker Court’s relabeling of this “Republican Form of Government” action as an 
“Equal Protection” one is unconvincing. The Court did not even attempt to explain how 
Tennessee’s apportionment statute violated the Equal Protection Clause as written and as 
always understood—that is, as protecting the civil rights of individuals and minorities, not 
political rights. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 226 (asserting that the Tennessee voters had stated 
a justiciable Equal Protection claim but setting forth no applicable legal standards). Al-
though the Court later established a “one person, one vote” standard, Justice Harlan dem-
onstrated that this principle had no constitutional foundation, and he lambasted the ma-
jority for recklessly interfering in the politics of state apportionment and voter-
qualification decisions. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 80. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) (deeming this power “plenary”). 
 81. The Chief Justice made precisely this point. Id. at 111-16 (Rehnquist, C.J., con-
curring). Article II clearly authorizes each state legislature, before the election, to set forth 
procedures governing the manner of appointing presidential electors. Arguably, Article II 
implicitly allows a legislature to protect this power by selecting electors according to these 
preexisting statutory standards and to disregard state judicial decisions that, in its inde-
pendent judgment, have altered this law. Indeed, Florida’s legislature seemed prepared to 
do just that, and the Court suggested that such action would be valid. See id. at 104 (“The 
State, of course, after granting the franchise in the special context of Article II, can take 
back the power to appoint electors.”). 
 By contrast, Profesor Krent would limit a state legislature to the initial enactment of 
statutes to govern the appointment of electors. If the state governor, state judges, or Con-
gress attempted to change that law after the election, the United States Supreme Court 
would be available to review and thwart such attempted amendments. See Krent, supra 
note 5, at 511. 
 Krent’s approach seems more sensible, for two reasons. First, the Florida Legislature it-
self delegated power to the executive branch to administer its election laws and to the judi-
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the Florida Legislature had delegated to its judiciary the power to 
adjudicate any disputes arising under its election laws, however, the 
Florida Supreme Court’s interpretation of those laws was entitled to 
the customary extraordinary deference that the U.S. Supreme Court 
gives such judgments.82 
 As Professor Krent has shown, the Court has become exceedingly 
reluctant to second-guess state judges’ constructions of state law and 
invariably rejects claims that they “changed” that law,83 except in 
very rare cases where the state court’s interpretation was demon-
strably arbitrary, biased, or totally unforeseeable.84 I share Krent’s 
opinion that this precedent required affirmance of the Florida Su-
preme Court, whose reading of its state’s election statutes was at 
least plausible—even if (as I believe) the concurring Justices’ inter-
pretation was far more persuasive.85  
                                                                                                                    
ciary to decide cases arising under them. Having “tied itself to the mast,” the legislature 
cannot untie itself when its courts issue a displeasing judgment. Second, a basic principle 
of the constitutional rule of law is that the legislature which makes a law cannot interpret 
and apply it in specific cases. See Shane, supra note 5, at 536. 
 Furthermore, it seems anachronistic for the Court to declare that Article II grants state 
legislatures “plenary power” over the selection of electors—including the right to name 
them directly, without any popular vote. See Bush, 531 U.S. at 102-03 (citing McPherson v. 
Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 35 (1892)). Baker and its progeny created a meta-constitutional prin-
ciple (located principally in the Fourteenth Amendment and Article I, Section 2 but also in 
the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments) that representation must reflect 
the equally weighted vote of each citizen. The Warren Court applied this principle to cur-
tail the state legislatures’ power over apportionment that the Constitution seemed to make 
as absolute as their authority over presidential elections. See Pushaw, Conservative Mir-
ror, supra note 3. 
 Hence, although I do not share Professor Shane’s enthusiasm for the apportionment 
cases, I agree that these decisions, as well as the whole post-Civil War “democratic trajec-
tory” of the Constitution’s amendments, make the Court’s embrace of McPherson very odd. 
See Shane, supra note 5, at 548. Of course, this debate is really academic, because neither 
the Florida Legislature nor any other state legislature has unilaterally named a slate of 
electors for over a century. 
 82. See infra notes 83-85 and accompanying text. 
 83. Krent, supra note 5, at 511-26. The reasons are both theoretical (e.g., concerns for 
federalism) and practical (e.g., the difficulty of determining which judicial applications of 
the law to new circumstances unreasonably “change” it). Id. at 524-26. 
 84. For example, the Court reversed a South Carolina tribunal’s creative interpreta-
tion of its state’s trespass law that was designed to deprive blacks of their federal Due 
Process rights. See Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 348-349 (1964); see also Krent, 
supra note 5, at 512-21 (discussing Bouie and the few other cases overruling state judicial 
constructions of state law, and establishing that the Court has ceased questioning any 
state decisions that may affect federal Contracts Clause rights). 
 85. See Krent, supra note 5, at 497 (“The Florida Supreme Court’s construction of 
Florida law, while in no way dictated by precedent or the plain language of the statutory 
scheme, was at a minimum, plausible. The U.S. Supreme Court has consistently failed to 
disturb far more questionable state court decisions . . . . ”). Indeed, the very fact that the 
four dissenting Justices would have deferred to the Florida court’s interpretation indicates 
that it was at least reasonable. See id. at 501-02. 
 Nonetheless, the concurring Justices concluded that Bush was an exceptional case in 
which a state court had actually changed its state’s laws so as to frustrate federal inter-
ests. See Bush, 531 U.S. at 111-22 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). Specifically, they argued 
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 The second crucial provision, the Twelfth Amendment, gives Con-
gress broad discretion in counting—and hence determining the valid-
ity of—electoral votes.86 The Court should always affirm Congress’s 
decisions, absent some plain and egregious violation of the Twelfth 
Amendment87 or some other constitutional provision.88 
 Unfortunately, the Court did not wait for Florida to complete the 
process of appointing electors or for Congress to review the validity of 
Florida’s electoral votes. Thus, the critical justiciability issue in Bush 
was ripeness, not the political question doctrine. Here I concur with 
                                                                                                                    
that the Florida Supreme Court had violated Article II by overturning the Secretary of 
State’s reasonable exercise of her delegated statutory discretion to (1) enforce the 
legislature’s deadline for certification and ignore untimely ballots, and (2) construe “legal 
vote” as not requiring the counting of improperly marked ballots. Id. at 118-20 (Rehnquist, 
C.J., concurring). 
 However, the Chief Justice acknowledged that the provisions of Florida’s election code 
“may well admit of more than one interpretation.” Id. at 114 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
Yet if other constructions (presumably including that of the Florida court) were possible, 
then under longstanding precedent the U.S. Supreme Court should have deferred to them. 
See id. at 135-44 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Krent, supra note 5, at 530-33. 
 Like Professor Krent, I find it ironic that the concurring Justices charged a state court 
with “altering” rather than “interpreting” existing law in a case in which they were making 
up new Equal Protection law. See Krent, supra note 5, at 497. 
 Significantly, three distinguished conservative legal thinkers have concluded that, al-
though the Court’s Equal Protection analysis was dubious, it nonetheless properly inter-
vened to thwart the Florida Supreme Court’s nakedly political decisions and thus to pre-
serve the state legislature’s Article II power to direct the selection of presidential electors. 
See Robert H. Bork, Sanctimony Serving Politics: The Florida Fiasco, 19 NEW CRITERION 4, 
8-11 (2001); Richard A. Epstein, “In such Manner as the Legislature Thereof May Direct”: 
The Outcome in Bush v. Gore Defended, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 613 (2001); Richard A. Posner, 
Florida 2000: A Legal and Statistical Analysis of the Election Deadlock and the Ensuing 
Litigation, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 1. Professor McConnell echoed these arguments but also as-
serted that the majority had correctly applied Equal Protection law, which prohibited the 
Florida Supreme Court from authorizing wholly arbitrary vote-counting standards devel-
oped for partisan political advantage. See Michael W. McConnell, Two-and-a-Half Cheers 
for Bush v. Gore, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 657 (2001). 
 86. See supra notes 61-63. 
 87. For instance, assume the following four facts. First, Congress effectuates its 
Twelfth Amendment power by enacting a statute providing that, absent evidence of crimi-
nal or fraudulent misconduct, it will count the electoral votes certified by each state. Sec-
ond, the Republican Party controls Congress. Third, the Republican candidate for 
President would have won a very close election but for a third-party candidate who beat 
him in Utah (with the Democratic candidate finishing a distant third there). Fourth, in 
counting the electoral votes, Congress determines that the votes for third-party candidates 
are not valid and thus awards Utah’s electoral votes to the Republican candidate.  
 In that situation, the Supreme Court could reverse Congress’s decision. Admittedly, this 
scenario is farfetched, but that is exactly the point: In all other circumstances the Court 
must defer to Congress’s judgments about validity where the question is open to differing 
views (e.g., whether certain electoral votes were procured fraudulently, whether they were 
received by the deadline, etc.). 
 88. An example of such a palpable and extreme violation would be Congress’s refusal 
to count electoral votes because they were cast by women or Hispanics. 
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Professor Shane and Justice Souter that the Court’s intervention was 
premature.89 
III.   FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT ISSUES 
A.   Equal Protection 
 Seven Justices held that the Florida Supreme Court had violated 
the Equal Protection Clause by failing to set forth specific standards 
to ensure uniform application of the general statutory “intent of the 
voter” touchstone.90 Professor Shane correctly deplores “the shallow-
ness of the majority’s analysis.”91 The Equal Protection Clause does 
not require states to be rigorously consistent in administering elec-
tions and counting votes, and it certainly does not prohibit the “in-
tent of the voter” standard for determining ballot validity that many 
states use.92  
 Indeed, our constitutional system of federal elections virtually 
guarantees some unequal treatment of voters in order to promote the 
competing goals of federalism and decentralization. As explained 
above, Article II authorizes each state legislature to regulate the pro-
cedures for selecting presidential electors.93 The states, in turn, have 
                                                                                                                    
 89. See Bush, 531 U.S. at 129 (Souter, J., dissenting) (speculating that, if the Court 
had not intervened, the state and Congress may have worked out the problem and “there 
would ultimately have been no issue requiring our review”). Professor Shane also argues 
that the Court intervened too soon and adds that Congress probably would have done no 
worse than the Court in sorting out this mess—and would have been held directly account-
able for any mistakes. Shane, supra note 5, at 537. 
 In the Bush majority’s defense, however, the Warren Court made ripeness a discretion-
ary determination. It directed judges to evaluate “the fitness of the issues for judicial deci-
sion and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.” Abbott Labs. v. 
Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967). The Bush majority might reasonably have concluded 
that (1) the Article II and Equal Protection questions presented needed no further devel-
opment, and (2) postponement may have caused hardship by permitting the recount to con-
tinue and the victor to be announced, only to have the Court invalidate the outcome—or 
perhaps not to have had enough time to issue a judgment, given the tight deadlines for se-
lecting presidential electors. See Pushaw, Conservative Mirror, supra note 3. 
 90. See Bush, 531 U.S. at 103-08 (per curiam opinion joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and 
O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ.); id. at 134 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 145-
46 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 91. Shane, supra note 5, at 584. 
 92. See Bush, 531 U.S. at 124-26 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id. (maintaining 
that the Florida Supreme Court, by ordering a manual recount pursuant to an “intent of 
the voter” standard subject to review by a judge to reconcile any discrepancies, did not run 
afoul of the Equal Protection Clause). 
 93. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text. Professor Shane argues that Sec-
tion 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment gave individual citizens the right to vote in presiden-
tial elections, thereby limiting Article II’s absolute grant to state legislatures of the power 
to select electors however they pleased (including by direct appointment). See Shane, supra 
note 5 at 572-73.  
 Although Shane’s claim is supportable, I think that if the Amendment’s drafters had in-
tended such a radical change, they would have done so far more directly. Moreover, such 
textual vagueness is important because the historical evidence is conflicting. See, e.g., Rey-
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allowed each county considerable autonomy over the details, such as 
ballot design and voting machinery.94 As Professor Shane points out, 
such disparities will likely have a greater impact on election results 
than allowing each county to use different standards in determining 
“intent of voter.”95 Thus, applying searching Equal Protection scru-
tiny to state election laws would cause massive instability.96 
 Nonetheless, Bush’s “shallow” reasoning is an improvement over 
Baker’s, which was nonexistent. The Warren Court deliberately de-
clined to set forth any substantive legal standards under the Equal 
Protection Clause, but rather simply held the voters’ unprecedented 
claim to be justiciable.97 Only later did the Court fabricate the “one 
person, one vote” maxim, itself a simplistic slogan that ignored the 
many nonpopulation interests involved in legislative representa-
tion.98 These cases effectively put federal judges in charge of restruc-
turing state legislatures, thereby dealing a devastating blow to fed-
eralism.99  
 Indeed, the very fact that Baker and its progeny had already been 
decided makes Bush more acceptable.100 Generally speaking, the ap-
portionment cases created a “precedent” for the Justices to interpret 
the Equal Protection Clause very creatively to solve perceived na-
tionwide electoral crises, even if doing so interferes with state auton-
                                                                                                                    
nolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 589-614 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (contending that the 
Fourteenth Amendment did not affect the states’ preexisting power over their citizens’ vot-
ing qualifications, and noting that Section 2 expressly recognized each state’s authority to 
“deny” or “abridge” the right to vote and attached a penalty for doing so—suffering a pro-
portional reduction in the basis of its representation). 
 94. See Bush, 531 U.S. at 126 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 95. Shane, supra note 5, at 572-74. 
 96. The Court, however, was careful not to question statutory discrepancies in voting 
systems among and within the states, and indeed it acknowledged that local entities “may 
develop different systems for implementing elections.” Bush, 531 U.S. at 109. Rather, the 
majority stressed that “a state court with the power to assure uniformity has ordered a 
statewide recount with minimal procedural safeguards.” Id. 
 The Court underscored this point by limiting its holding “to the present circumstances, 
for the problem of equal protection in election processes generally presents many complexi-
ties.” Id. Presumably, “the present circumstances” refers to court-ordered recounts in con-
tested elections, not to all state statutory disparities in voting matters. If by “the present 
circumstances” the majority meant the facts of Bush only, then the Court engaged in fiat 
rather than adjudication, which requires the consistent application of legal principles in 
successive cases. See Pushaw, Conservative Mirror, supra note 3; see also Shane, supra 
note 5, at 580 (deeming “suspect” the “self-declaration that the Justices may be writing a 
ticket for one ride only”). 
 By contrast, even though the Warren Court made up the “one person, one vote” rule, it 
intended to (and did) apply it in all later decisions. See supra notes 32-38 and accompany-
ing text; see also Shane, supra note 5, at 583 (contending that judicial activism can be con-
structive but only if the new constitutional values can be articulated in “adequately neu-
tral principles to be persuasively applicable to foreseeable future cases”). 
 97. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text. 
 98. See supra notes 32-39 and accompanying text. 
 99. See id. 
 100. See Pushaw, Conservative Mirror, supra note 3. 
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omy in administering elections.101 More specifically, the Rehnquist 
Court, unlike the Warren Court, actually had some precedent that at 
least colorably justified its ruling.  
 First, the majority found that, because the Florida Legislature 
had exercised its electoral appointment power by authorizing its citi-
zens to vote, Reynolds gave them a fundamental right which could 
not be infringed by arbitrary treatment that valued one person’s vote 
over another’s.102 Second, Gray barred states from disparately treat-
ing voters in different counties.103 The majority held that, contrary to 
these cases, the Florida Supreme Court had authorized “standardless 
manual recounts,”104 with the result that two voter ballots marked 
exactly the same way would not necessarily be counted identically.105 
In fact, “the standards for accepting or rejecting contested ballots 
might vary not only from county to county but indeed within a single 
county from one recount team to another.”106  
 It is this last discrepancy, I suspect, that the Court found particu-
larly galling. Canvassing boards and counting teams in heavily De-
mocratic counties switched from their established (and thus politi-
cally neutral) written guidelines for determining the legal validity of 
ballots to progressively more lenient standards (for example, from 
completely detached to partially detached to merely indented 
chads).107 Millions of Americans watching on television, and virtually 
all Republicans, concluded that these constant changes were made to 
help Al Gore get more votes.108 Moreover, the majority apparently 
found it more than a mere coincidence that the solidly Democratic 
Florida Supreme Court happened to decide every major issue in favor 
of the Democratic candidate.109 These Justices would find disingenu-
ous Professor Shane’s comment that “it is hard to predict who [would 
                                                                                                                    
 101. See supra notes 20-38 and accompanying text. 
 102. Bush, 531 U.S. at 104-05 (citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964)); see 
supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text. 
 103.  Bush, 531 U.S. at 107 (citing Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963)); see supra 
notes 34-35, 57 and accompanying text. 
 104. Bush, 531 U.S. at 103. 
 105. Id. at 104-09. 
 106. Id. at 106. For instance, in Miami-Dade County, three canvassing board members 
used three separate standards in defining a legal vote. Id. Similarly, Palm Beach County 
“changed its evaluative standards during the counting process”: It “began . . . with a 1990 
guideline which precluded counting completely attached chads, switched to a rule that con-
sidered a vote to be legal if any light could be seen through a chad, changed back to the 
1990 rule, and then abandoned any pretense of a per se rule, only to have a court order 
that the county consider dimpled chads legal.” Id. at 106-07. 
 107. See supra note 106. 
 108. The Justices simply noted the changes and did not mention the partisanship that 
motivated them, but it is not too hard to connect the dots. 
 109. Again, the majority did not make any direct accusations, but Justice Stevens 
found them implicit. See Bush, 531 U.S. at 128 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing the 
Court for an “unstated lack of confidence in the impartiality and capacity of the state 
judges who would make the critical decisions if the vote count were to proceed”). 
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have been] hurt by” the Florida Supreme Court’s order allowing dif-
ferent standards for evaluating contested ballots, limiting recounts to 
“undervotes” in some counties but counting all ballots in others, and 
permitting partial recounts from some counties but complete totals 
from others.110 
 In short, this evidence suggests that the Bush majority genuinely 
believed they were upholding the integrity of the votes cast and thus 
promoting democratic ideals. Consequently, I reject Professor 
Shane’s charge that the Court sought to thwart the right to suffrage 
and thereby “betrayed” democracy.111 I also have no basis for doubt-
ing that the Warren Court Justices sincerely felt that they were fur-
thering democracy by crafting a “one person, one vote” standard.112  
 The crucial point is that Baker and its progeny repose trust in a 
majority of Justices to subjectively determine what is “democratic.” 
Under the “law” of Baker, that gut call will sometimes produce a lib-
eral political outcome, and sometimes a conservative one.113 
                                                                                                                    
 110. Shane, supra note 5, at 552. On the contrary, it is pretty easy to predict that Bush 
would have been harmed. First, permitting different standards to determine a legal vote 
appeared to help Gore, especially in light of the seemingly partisan changing of standards. 
See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text. Second, the Florida Supreme Court’s order 
selectively confining recounts in heavily Democratic Miami-Dade County to 9000 under-
votes, Bush, 531 U.S. at 102-03, would likely have injured Bush because the majority of 
those votes were presumably Democratic, and the canvassing board members there were 
using multiple standards. See supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text. Third, moving 
beyond the realm of educated guesses, the Florida court’s decision to accept partial re-
counts from Miami-Dade actually yielded 168 Gore votes. Bush, 531 U.S. at 102-03. So did 
its addition of 215 Gore votes from Palm Beach County, even though they were submitted 
after the Florida Supreme Court’s own November 26 deadline. Id. 
 111. See Shane, supra note 5, at 583. Of course, I do not deny that the perceptions of 
some of the Republican Justices may have been influenced by their own political biases. 
But neither Professor Shane nor anyone else has presented any evidence that those Jus-
tices deliberately decided Bush according to their political predilections in order to deprive 
people of their right to vote and undermine democracy. 
 112. See supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text. 
 113. Thus, commentators like Professor Shane cannot consistently laud Baker and its 
progeny while condemning Bush. Conversely, conservatives cannot fairly criticize Baker as 
a symbol of Warren Court political excess while cheering Bush as “valiant” and “legitimate 
in law.” See Bork, supra note 85, at 8-11. Rather, legal consistency requires either accept-
ing both decisions or (as I do) rejecting both.  
 Although some regard consistency as “the hobgoblin of little minds,” I think it is essen-
tial to the legitimacy of adjudication and hence the rule of law. I cling to the quaint view 
that the Court should apply principles of “law” rooted in the Constitution’s clauses as illu-
minated by (1) the history of their drafting, ratification, and early implementation, (2) un-
derlying structural principles such as separation of powers and federalism, (3) Federalist 
political theory, and (4) precedent based on these materials and gradually adapted over the 
years. See, e.g., Pushaw, Case/Controversy, supra note 2, at 448, 468-517. Accordingly, I 
reject the modern Court’s assertion of untethered discretion in many critical areas of con-
stitutional law. See, e.g., Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts and 
the Structural Constitution, 86 IOWA L. REV. 735 (2001) (setting forth historically based le-
gal standards to govern federal judges’ exercise of “inherent authority,” which is currently 
invoked to rationalize virtually any action related to managing litigation or imposing sanc-
tions); Grant S. Nelson & Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Rethinking the Commerce Clause: Apply-
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B.   Due Process and Related Concerns 
 Professor Shane develops an elaborate, and defensible, argument 
that the Due Process Clause required hand recounts in the four chal-
lenged counties.114 I am not persuaded, however, that this Clause 
mandates such a specific remedy. Indeed, to the extent that the Flor-
ida Supreme Court ordered manual recounts but did not ensure fair 
and consistent standards, that failure may have violated the Due 
Process Clause.115  
 More specifically, Shane characterizes Bush as a type of mass 
administrative adjudication of individual claims, like Social Secu-
rity.116 Although there are certain similarities, I do not think that 
Bush was primarily about vindicating individual rights. Rather, the 
case really concerned the interest of all Americans in ensuring the 
integrity of the electoral process in selecting their only single na-
tional leader.  
CONCLUSION 
 The panelists have made several persuasive arguments. For in-
stance, Professor Krent correctly contends that precedent authorized 
the Court to exercise jurisdiction but obliged it to defer to the Florida 
Supreme Court’s decision. Likewise, Professor Shane properly ex-
poses the shortcomings of Bush v. Gore’s Equal Protection analysis. 
Nonetheless, I cannot agree with either of them that the Court’s de-
cision in Bush is wholly unprecedented. Rather, Baker is directly on 
point, even if none of the Justices mentioned it. 
                                                                                                                    
ing First Principles to Uphold Federal Commercial Regulations but Preserve State Control 
Over Social Issues, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1999) (developing a legal test for the Commerce 
Clause that is faithful to history yet workable in resolving modern disputes). 
 114. Shane, supra note 5, at 553-68. 
 115. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 103, 110 (2000) (alluding to this alternative basis for 
its holding of unconstitutionality). 
 116. Shane, supra note 5, at 562-63. 
